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We document shareholder support for wealth-decreasing changes 
in corporate governance in the form of antitakeover charter 
amendments.  The enactment of these amendments is shown to be 
related to ownership structure.  This gives rise to a sample 
selection bias that contaminates traditional event-study results 
and explains the discrepancy between our findings and those 
reported in previous studies.  We also provide evidence that 
strategic behavior by managers plays a role in the adoption of 
these amendments. 
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Previous studies of antitakeover amendments that are adopted 
with the approval  of shareholders have focused primarily  on the 
wealth effects associated with the enactment of these amendments, 
and to  a lesser extent on the ownership structure of the firms that 
adopt  them.  The accumulated  evidence  concerning  the impact  of 
these  amendments  on  shareholder  wealth  is  weak,  with  point 
estimates that range from slightly negative to slightly positive.' 
Ownership data and voting patterns suggest that the amendments are 
supported  by  corporate  insiders  and  opposed  by  the  typical 
institutional in~estor.~  In addition, it has been noted that firms 
with  amendments in place are less likely to receive a bid  than 
firms  in  the same  industries  without  antitakeover  amendments.  3 
'stock-price reactions to antitakeover measures are 
documented by DeAngelo and Rice  (1983),  Jarrell and Poulsen 
(1988),  and Linn and McConnell  (1983).  Jarrell and Poulsen 
identify wealth effects that are negative and statistically 
significant for some types of amendments using a 31-day return 
window, and effects that are negative but not statistically 
significant in shorter return windows. 
2~rickley,  Lease, and Smith (1988)  document voting patterns 
consistent with the hypothesis that institutional investors 
oppose antitakeover amendments, while corporate insiders support 
their adoption.  Jarrell and Poulsen (1988) report insider 
holdings that are above average and institutional holdings that 
are below average in a large sample of firms that enact 
amendments. 
3~ound  (1987)  studies a sample of 100 firms listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)  that adopted both a supermajority 
amendment and a classified board amendment between 1973 and 1979, 
and a control sample of 100 NYSE-listed firms that do not have 
amendments in place.  He finds that members of the former group 
are significantly less likely to  receive a bid than members of 
the latter group.  Note, however, that the sample design controls 
for neither size, industry, earnings history, nor ownership 
structure.  Our evidence, as well as that presented by Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny  (1989), indicates that this may give rise to 
a serious sample selection problem. 
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that antitakeover amendments protect managers from the discipline 
of the takeover market while harming shareholders. 
The  willingness  of  shareholders  to  approve  antitakeover 
proposals and the lack of conclusive evidence on  wealth effects are 
of  course  subject  to  the  alternative  interpretation  that  the 
amendments are not actually injurious to  shareholder^.^  There are 
reasonable  arguments to support  this view.  One,  based  on  the 
notion  that  a  strong  manager  can  strike  a  better  bargain  for 
shareholders,  is  inconsistent  with  evidence  provided  by  Pound 
(1987),  who reports that amendments do not increase bid  premium^.^ 
A  second argument  that  is more  difficult  to refute empirically 
holds  that  managers  of  firms that  adopt  amendments  are  simply 
enjoying contractual protection against takeovers that is afforded 
to  them by  shareholders.  If we are to conclude that antitakeover 
amendments  are  harmful  to  shareholders,  it  is  important  to 
establish that enactment does, in fact, impose a cost.  Then the 
question of shareholder support for  these amendments still begs for 
an explanation.  6 
4~rickley,  Lease, and Smith (1988)  find that 96  percent of 
the amendments in their sample of 288 proposals are approved by 
shareholders. 
5~e~ngelo  and Rice  (1983)  articulate the hypothesis that 
managers who enjoy the protection of amendments have a stronger 
bargaining position.  Pound's finding concerning bid premiums is 
subject to the sample selection problem noted in footnote 3. 
'%hen  the topic of shareholder support for antitakeover 
amendments is discussed at all, approval is frequently attributed 
to  the free-rider problem.  Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter  (1988) 
take this position. 
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In this paper, we report the results of a study that examines 
these  issues.  We  provide  evidence  on  the wealth  effects  of 
antitakeover amendments that is substantially stronger than the 
evidence  presented by previous authors.  Estimates that incorporate 
prior information about the likelihood of adoption, as well as the 
returns realized by firms that might have proposed amendments but 
did  not  do  so, indicate that the  adoption of  an  antitakeover 
amendment is associated with a statistically significant negative 
wealth effect on the order of 1  percent of firm value.  This effect 
is consistent across different types  of amendments, including fair- 
price  amendments.  Moreover,  we  are  able  to  account  for  the 
discrepancy between  our results and  those reported by  previous 
authors.  The application of standard event-study techniques  to our 
data  yields  estimated  wealth  effects  consistent  with  previous 
results.  The different conclusions concerning wealth effects are 
attributable  to a sample selection  bias that arises  when events are 
anticipated and inference is based on only one type of outcome. 
We also consider the role of ownership structure in the proxy 
process, in an attempt to characterize that selection bias and to 
explain  why  some  firms  adopt  amendments while  others  do  not. 
Significant differences are documented between a large sample of 
firms that  adopt  antitakeover amendments and  a  control  sample 
selected on the basis of size and industry.  An econometric model 
suggests that parties with  representation on a firm's board  of 
directors exert a very strong influence on whether an antitakeover 
amendment will  be  enacted.  The  ownership  stake  of  the  chief 
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executive and the voting power of employee stock ownership plans 
(ESOPs) are found to be especially  important.  The presence of 
institutional investors,  who are not typically represented on the 
board,  does  not appear  to  affect  the  adoption  of amendments,  though 
this finding must be qualified because of a potentially serious 
errors-in-variables  problem. 
Finally, we  examine  the issue of  shareholder support  for 
wealth-decreasing  changes in corporate  governance.  We  document  two 
types of strategic behavior that provide a partial explanation of 
this  phenomenon  and  complement  our  evidence  concerning  the 
significance of board membership.  The first involves  the  bundling 
of agenda items that are likely to be considered more desirable 
with  items  that  are  likely  to be  regarded  less  favorably by 
shareholders.  A  second  variety  comes  in  the  form  of hidden 
antitakeover amendments.  Our data do not afford a direct test of 
the effect of these activities on shareholder wealth.  But the 
board structure of firms that engage in these activities and the 
econometric evidence cited above suggest  that shareholder approval 
of  proposed  antitakeover  amendments  represents  less  than  a 
wholesale endorsement of managerial resistance to takeover bids. 
The remainder of this paper  is organized as follows.  We 
describe our data and present summary  statistics for ownership 
structure,  the proxy agenda, and wealth effects in section 2.  Our 
econometric analysis is presented  in section 3.  We discuss our 
results in section 4  and summarize our conclusions in section 5. 
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2.1  Sample Construction 
We  constructed  a  sample  of  proxy  statements  containing 
proposed  antitakeover  charter  amendments  using  the Jarrell  and 
Poulsen (1988) sample and a group of proxy statements containing 
proposed antigreenmail charter  amendment^.^  The latter sample was 
supplied  by  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  (NYSE).  All  proxy 
statements in the combined sample were mailed during 1984 or 1985. 
From this  sample of 210 firms, we eliminated those observations for 
which  a copy  of the proxy  statement  could  not  be  found  in the 
disclosure data base, and observations in which the firm failed to 
appear on  the  Center  for Research  in  Securities  Prices  (CRSP) 
monthly master during the month preceding the proxy mailing date. 
This produced a sample of 187 firms. 
We  constructed  a second  sample by  selecting  from  the CRSP 
monthly master that firm closest in total equity value to the firm 
proposing the antitakeover amendment, from the set of all firms 
having  the  same  three-digit  standard  industrial  classification 
(SIC)  code.  We refer to this group of firms as the random sample 
although  it  involves  a  size  and  industry  control,  because  the 
sample includes firms that proposed  antitakeover amendments and 
7~ntigreenmail  amendments require managers to obtain 
shareholder approval prior to a targeted repurchase of an equity 
stake at a premium relative to the market price.  Jarrell and 
Poulsenls  sample is drawn from Kidder, Peabody &  Co.  (1984) and 
the Securities and Exchange Commissionls  Office of Tender Offers. 
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firms that did  not propose   amendment^.^  For each  firm  in the 
random sample,  we located the proxy statement whose mailing date 
was closest to the mailing date of the corresponding firm in the 
antitakeover sample.  Complete proxy documents were available for 
176 firms. 
After reading each of the 363 proxy statements,  we decided to 
exclude  from  further  analysis  those  firms  with  5  percent 
blockholders  who  might  be  considered  to  represent  affiliated 
enterprises.  The typical blockholder in this group is an officer 
of a  firm holding a minority  stake in the excluded firm.  The 
purpose of applying this filter,  which resulted in the elimination 
of four firms from the amendment sample and  14  firms from the 
random sample,  is  to  prevent our  results from being contaminated  by 
the  presence  of  firms  where  blockholders  are  qualitatively 
different from the blockholders who are present in the remaining 
firms.  The implications  of  excludingthis  subsample  are  discussed 
below. 
In the analysis that follows, we provide two-way comparisons 
between firms that propose antitakeover amendments and firms that 
do  not.  The sample of firms that propose amendments comprises 183 
firms from the original sample plus the 14  firms in the random 
sample that proposed amendments.  We refer to the remaining 148 
firms in the random sample as the control sample or the clean 
8~he  Jarrell and Poulsen sample is not purported to be 
exhaustive, so it is not surprising that the random sample 
contains firms that proposed antitakeover amendments. 
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sample.  Names, mailing dates, and proxy agenda for all 345 firms 
are listed in appendix A. 
2.2  The Agenda 
Our taxonomy of the antitakeover amendments found on these 
proxy  statements is presented in table 1.  It differs from that 
used by Jarrell and Poulsen in a number of respects.  The category 
labeled "entrench the board of directorsl1  contains all provisions 
that would make it more difficult for an outsider to gain control 
of the  board.  Included in this category are amendments stipulating 
that directors may  be  removed  only  for cause, amendments that 
eliminate shareholders1 right  to vote  by  written  consent, and 
amendments that limit the rights of shareholders to call a special 
meeting or nominate candidates to the board, in addition to the 
classified board  amendments considered by  Jarrell and  Poulsen. 
Fair-price  and  supermajority amendments  are  treated  as  a 
single category, primarily because our sample contains only two 
pure supermajority  amendments.  This is consistent  with Jarrell and 
Poulsenls  observation that the popularity of these amendments has 
waned over time.  It is also worthwhile to note that while most of 
the  fair-price amendments in the sample conform roughly to the 
description offered by  Jarrell and  Poulsen, a number  of  those 
labeled  as  fair-price  amendments  closely  resemble  pure 
superma  jority amendments.  In some  cases,  the fair  price is  defined 
to be the maximum of the outstanding share price during the two 
years  preceding the offer.  Market valuations may be abandoned 
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The  frequency  of  antitakeover  amendments  and  strategic behavior  in  a sample  of  183  proxy statements  for NYSE 
Listed firms offering antitakeover  charter amendments during 1984-85,  and  in  a sample  of  162  proxy statements 
for a control group selected on  the basis of size and  industry. 
Frequency of  Charter Amendments 
Type  of amendment 
Entrench the board of directors 
Fair-price or supermajority 
Antigreemil 
Blank check  preferred stock 
At  Least  one  of  the above 
Type  of behavior 
H i  dden  amendments 
Amendment  sample  Random  sample 1 
110  12 
136  9 
44  1 
33  4 
183  14 
Frequency  of Strategic Behavior 
Amendment  sample 
Bundled agenda  24 
Sample size 
Random  sample 
1 
0 
1  -  This sample  is  random with respect  to the presence of charter amendments on the proxy statement,  but does 
involve a size and  industry control. 
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establish a fair  price after consulting an investment banker of its 
choice.  These provisions  substantially  expand  the number  of 
situations in which supermajority voting is triggered.9 
With  the  exception  of  blank-check  preferred  stock,  the 
remaining categories in our taxonomy are additions to  the array of 
takeover defenses  considered  in  the Jarrell  and  Poulsen  study. 
Antigreenmail amendments  bar management from engaging in a targeted 
share repurchase at a premium above the market price without the 
prior  consent  of  shareholders.  lo  Repurchases  offered  to  all 
shareholders on an equal basis and repurchases made  in the open 
market  are routinely exempt from the restrictions imposed by the 
amendment.  In  some  cases,  lllong-termll  shareholders  are  also 
exempt.  11 
Although  it  is  not  clear  that  an  antigreenmail  amendment 
reduces the likelihood of a takeover,  these amendments do play an 
important role in the adoption of other antitakeover amendments. 
One function of the antigreenmail amendment is to  hide substantive 
antitakeover provisions.  An example is the Diamond Shamrock proxy 
statement of April 12, 1985, which requests shareholder approval of 
an  agenda  item  It. .  . to deter  greenmail  and  other  self  -dealing 
9~ound  (1987) notes that the procedural requirements in 
fair-price amendments may impose a heavy cost on potential 
bidders. 
'O~ann  and DeAngelo  (1983) and Bradley and Wakeman  (1983) 
examine the impact of targeted repurchases on shareholder wealth. 
"~ilson  (1988) describes the structure of antigreenmail 
amendments. 
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the proxy  reveals that the self-dealing transactions include all 
mergers, consolidations, and recapitalizations of the corporation 
that transpire when a single stockholder owns more than 5 percent 
of  the  voting  stock  of  the  corporation.  The  deterrent  that 
shareholders  are  asked  to approve  is disenfranchisement  of  the 
blockholder: The approval of either a majority of the shareholders 
other  than  the  5  percent  blockholder,  or  a  majority  of  the 
disinterested  directors  is  required  to  effect  any  of  the 
transactions deemed to be self-dealing.  Moreover,  disinterested 
directors  are defined as  those  not affiliated with the  blockholder, 
who is therefore precluded from either voting his shares in favor 
of a merger, or having his representative on the  board of directors 
participate in the decision-making process.  12 
A second type  of hidden amendment is unrelated to  the  adoption 
of an antigreenmail provision.  These amendments ask shareholders 
to approve reincorporation in the state of Delaware.  Substantial 
antitakeover provisions not implied by the act of reincorporation 
are included in the agenda item but not described in the  notice of 
121f B is the number of shares owned by the blockholder and 
a is the fraction of votes required for approval, the amendment 
discussed in the text increases the votes required for passage 
whenever B >  2a-1.  The amendment is always binding when simple 
majority voting is in effect.  When a=0.75, the amendment does 
not become effective until the blockholder acquires 50 percent of 
the shares.  One firm in our sample addressed this loophole with 
another provision that calls for cumulative voting when the 
beneficial ownership of a blockholder reaches 30 percent of the 
outstanding votes.  The structure of this amendment is similar to 
that of the antitakeover law recently enacted in the state of 
Pennsylvania. 
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cases involving both reincorporation in Delaware and the adoption 
of additional antitakeover provisions that are not classified as 
hidden.  In  those  cases,  the  presence  of  the  antitakeover 
amendments  is  disclosed  in  the  notice  of  annual  meeting. 
Descriptions of the  eight cases of hidden amendments are presented 
in table 2. 
A second case of strategic behavior involving antigreenmail 
amendments  is  the  bundling  of  agenda  items  that  shareholders 
presumably  favor with agenda  items they might  be predisposed  to 
.  reject.  The  advantage  realized  by  bundling  is  illustrated  in 
figure 1.  Suppose that one agenda item has a wealth effect of w, 
and a second has a wealth effect  of w2.  When shareholders vote 
separately on the two items, both  are approved only  in the case 
where wl  >  0 and w2 >  0.  This corresponds to the shaded region in 
the figure.  If, however,  shareholders are asked to vote on the 
package, they approve both amendments in all cases where 
wl  + w2  >  0.  The  marginal impact of bundling is that section of the 
half plane to  the  right of the line wl  + w2 = 0 which is not shaded. 
We  examine  bundling  in  the  context  of  the  antigreenmail 
amendment.13  If these amendments are likely to be approved by 
13~  prominent example of bundling is provided by a case that 
is not in our sample, which does not involve an antigreenmail 
amendment.  In December of 1988, Inco of Canada asked 
shareholders to approve a single agenda item authorizing a 
wpoison-pilln rights plan and a special dividend of $10 per share 
(Wall  Street Journal, December 12, 1988). The packaging of these 
provisions caused such an uproar that the board of directors 
agreed to a second nonbindinq vote on the poison-pill provision. 
The amendment passed the second test as well. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 2 
Description of  eight hidden antitakeover  amendments  from a sample  of proxy statements  for 197 NYSE  Listed 
firms that proposed antitakeover  amendments  during 1984-1985. 
Firm 
Atlantic Richfield Co. 
Bausch  &  Lomb  Inc. 
Diamond Shamrock  Corp. 
Description of amendment 
Agenda  item is Labeled as  reincorporation in  Delaware.  Additional 
provisions that are not described in  the notice of annual  meeting: 
directors may  be  removed only by a two-thirds vote of shareholders, 
shareholders  may  no  Longer  call special meetings,  shareholders may  not 
propose charter amendments. 
Effect of the antigreenmail  amendment  is  to disenfranchise  the blockholder. 
Effect of the antigreenmail amendment  is  to  disenfranchise  the blockholder. 
Other  provisions attached to  a separate  agenda  item that affects a 
classified board:  80 percent vote to remove directors,  incumbent  directors 
may  be  removed only by a majority of  the continuing directors,  special 
meetings may  be called only by the chairman  or a majority of  the board, 
stockholders must  provide advance  notice to propose business  at meetings  or 
nominate candidates  for the board,  and cmlative  voting is  in  effect if 
any  shareholder  owns  30 percent of the voting shares. 
Eastern Gas  &  Fuel  Assoc.  Effect of the antigreenmail amendment  is  to disenfranchise  the blockholder. 
Other  provisions attached to a separate  agenda  item that affects a 
classified board:  vacancies  are to be filled  by  incumbents,  80 percent 
vote to remove  directors,  sharehol.ders must  notify the board of nominees 45 
days  before a meeting. 
Genisco Technology  Corp. 
Gou 1  d 
Holiday Inns  Inc. 
Waste Management  Inc. 
Agenda  item that  is Labeled as  reincorporation in  Delaware.  The  agenda 
item also includes a fair price/supermajority  provision,  the elimination of 
shareholder  rights to call a special  meeting,  and  Limitations on  the right 
to inspect shareholder  Lists. 
Effect of the antigreermail amendment  is  to disenfranchise  the blockholder. 
Agenda  item #I  is Labeled as  reincorporation in  Delaware.  This  implies 
that cumulative voting is  eliminated and directors may  be  removed only for 
cause.  The  same  agenda  item requests the approval  of fair 
price/supermajority,  director entrenchment,  and  antigreenmail provisions. 
Effect of the antigreenmai 1  amendment  is  to disenfranchise  the blockholder. 
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The  effect of bundling two  proposals as a single agenda  item.  wi  represents the 
wealth effect of proposal i. Agenda with wealth effects in the shaded region are 
acceptable if the items are considered separately.  Agenda  with wealth effects 
to the right of  wl  + w2  = 0  are acceptable if the items are combined. 
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managers may  be  able to implement an antitakeover amendment by 
offering the two charter amendments as a package.  This leads to a 
joint hypothesis:  antigreenmail amendments have  a  non-negative 
impact  on  the wealth  of  shareholders, antitakeover  amendments 
decrease shareholder  wealth, and bundling induces  the  acceptance  of 
an antitakeover amendment that would otherwise be rejected.  Note 
that there is a distinction between hidden charter amendments and 
charter amendments  that are bundled with antigreenmail amendments. 
In the latter case, the companion amendment is visible, while in 
the former case it is not. 
The last type of antitakeover amendment that we consider is 
blank-check preferred stock.  These charter amendments authorize 
the issuance of stock with voting rights that may be specified by 
the board  of directors at the date of issue.  We do not treat 
preferred stock issues where the voting rights are fixed as  blank- 
check authorizations.  This distinguishes our sample from those 
considered by some previous authors.  14 
I4~he  utility of this type of amendment in defending against 
a hostile takeover is currently ambiguous.  In July 1988, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted rule 19c-4 under 
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, which prohibits a stock 
exchange from listing the stock of a company that takes any 
action that diminishes the voting rights of existing 
shareholders.  The rule states that "...  any issuance ... or any 
other type of distribution of stock in which the securities 
issued have voting rights greater than the per share voting 
rights of any outstanding class of the common stock of the 
issuer..."  is presumed to be disenfranchising.  This would seem 
to apply to blank-check preferred stock, although most rulings 
issued by the stock exchanges thus far have concerned dual class 
ownership.  The SEC rule was struck down by an appeals court in 
June 1990.  In any event, amendments authorizing blank-check 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm15 
2.3  Compensation and Ownership 
In  the  remaining  part  of  section  2,  we  report  summary 
statistics for 197 firms that proposed some sort of antitakeover 
amendment, and  for 148 firms that did  not  propose  antitakeover 
amendments.  Ownership data,  except where  otherwise noted,  are 
taken from the proxy statement and SEC 10K filings. 
Summary  statistics  for  the  compensation  of  directors  and 
officers, and ownership by  those individuals, appear in table 3. 
The total equity interest of an officer or director is calculated 
using beneficial ownership of common shares and the stock price 
outstanding at the end  of the month preceding the proxy mailing 
date.  Beneficial ownership includes direct ownership, indirect 
ownership  through  family  members,  trusts  or  partnerships,  and 
contingent  ownership  in  the form  of  stock options  that may  be 
exercised within 60 days.  l5  ~enef  icial ownership of officers and 
directors as a group, corrected to  eliminate the  double counting of 
shares owned jointly, is reported in the proxy statement. 
The fraction of voting rights held by  officers and directors 
is calculated by subtracting from beneficial ownership  those  voting 
rights attributable to contingent ownership and by  adding voting 
rights attached to other securities such as preferred stock.  This 
preferred stock clearly had the potential to serve as a useful 
takeover defense at the time of proposal. 
I50n some proxy statements, the officers of the corporation 
list shares "...deemed  beneficially owned by  the SEC, to which 
beneficial ownership is disclaimed...."  We included these shares 
in beneficial ownership for all firms in an attempt to 
standardize the measurement of ownership. 
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Sumnary  statistics for ownership by officers and directors and  their compensation  in  a sample of 197  NYSE  Listed firms 
offering antitakeover  charter amendments  during 1984-1985,  and  a  control sample of 148  NYSE  Listed firms that do not 
offer antitakeover  charter amendments  during the same  period.  All data are from the proxy statement  and  10K  filings. 
Ownership  and  compensation for chief executive officers 
Amendment  sample1  Control sample  2 
Mean  Median  u  Mean  Median  u  3 
Equity stake in  millions of dollars  12.86  2.39  49.90  19.62  2.41  52.34 
Compensation  in  millions of dollars  0.60  0.45  0.71  0.49  0.36  0.64 
Compensation  as  a  percentage of  firm  0.20  0.08  0.34  0.55  0.13  3.26 
value 
Ratio of equity to  compensation 
Percentage  of  voting rights 
Equity stake in  millions of  dollars 
Compensation  in  millions of dollars 
Compensation as  a  percentage of  firm 
va 1  ue 
Ratio of equity to compensation 
Percentage  of  voting rights 
Ownership and  compensation  for all  directors and  officers as  a  group 
Amendment  sample  Control sample 
Mean  Median  u  Mean  Median  u 
57.89  17.93  128.50  45.13  17.26  75.95 
3.19  2.52  2.40  2.29  1.93  1.52 
0.83  0.46  1.04  1.26  0.66  1.58 
 he amendment  sample consists  of  all observations  in  table 1  for which  an antitakeover  charter 
amendment  is  found on  the proxy statement,  including those  firms in  the random sample  that satisfy this 
criterion. 
 he control sample  consists of  all observations  contained  in  table 1  for which  no antitakeover  charter 
amendments  are found  on the proxy statement. 
3~ample  standard deviation. 
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provides  a rough measure of the votes that we might  expect the 
officers and directors to control.  The measure is less than exact 
because  of  the  ambiguity  introduced  by  including  indirect 
ownership. 
Direct  compensation  for  the  chief  executive  and  for  all 
officers  and  directors  as  a  group  is  reported  on  the  proxy 
statement.  This does not  include compensation realized through 
dividends  or  the  exercise  of  stock  options,  which  may  be 
substantial.  The ratio of equity to compensation  is calculated 
using direct compensation and equity, as reported above.  In  many 
cases,  the  number  of  individuals  covered  in  the  report  of 
compensation paid to all officers and directors is different from 
the number  of  individuals  covered  in  the report  of beneficial 
ownership by officers and directors.  The economic meaning of these 
statistics,  especially  the  ratio,  is  therefore  less  clear  for 
officers and directors as a group than for the chief executive. 
Moreover,  the use of these variables  in a statistical model  is 
likely to be associated with an errors-in-variables problem. 
The ownership structure of firms that propose amendments is 
contrasted with the ownership  structure of the control group in 
table 4.  At firms that adopt amendments, both the chief executive 
officer and  all officers  and  directors  as a group earn greater 
direct compensation than their counterparts at firms that do not 
adopt amendments.  The dollar value of equity investment by these 
parties  is  not,  however,  significantly  different  for  the  two 
samples, implying that the  ratio of equity to  compensation tends  to 
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Differences in  ownership and  compensation  for officers and directors between  a sample  of 197 NYSE  Listed 
firms proposing charter amendments  during 1984-1985 and a sample  of 148 NYSE  Listed firms that do  not 
propose charter amendments during the same  period.  Each  test statistic is  calculated by subtracting the 
sample moment  for the control group from the corresponding sample  moment  for the group  of firms offering 
antitakeover amendments.  ALL  data are from the proxy statement  and  10K  filings. 
Differences  in  ownership and  compensation 
for chief executive officers 
Rank 
Mean  stat:sticl  statistic  x2 
Median  statistic 
Equity stake in  millions of dollars  -6.77  -1.22  -0.22  -0.01  0.00 
Compensation  in  millions of dollars  0.11  1.47  3.29*  0.08  5.95* 
Compensation as  a  percentage of  firm  -0.35  -1.51  -3.03*  -0.05  10.37* 
va 1  ue 
Ratio of equity to compensation  -2.40  -1.99  -1.13  -0.10  0.09 
Percentage of voting rights  -4.61  -4.32*  -3.46*  -0.52  7.57* 
Differences  in  ownership and  compensation 
for all officers and directors 
t  Rank 
Mean  statistic  statistic  x2 
Median  statistic 
Equity stake in  millions of dollars  12.76  1.07  0.75  0.67  0.07 
Compensation  in  millions of dollars  0.90  4.02*  3.53*  0.59  8.27* 
Compensation as  a  percentage of  firm  -0.43  -3.03*  -3.10*  -0.20  3.65 
va 1  ue 
Ratio of equity to compensation  -0.10  -0.25  -0.85  -0.20  1.29 
Percentage of voting rights  -6.65  -4.33*  -3.37*  -3.29  5.51 
'A  *  indicates that a  test statistic is  significantly different from zero at the 1  percent  Level  of 
significance. 
 he distribution of the nonparametric  rank statistic is  approximately  normal  in  Large  samples. 
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charter amendments hold  a  smaller  fraction of  the outstanding 
voting securities issued by the firm and realize a lesser fraction 
of  firm  value  as  compensation.  These  features  of  ownership 
structure reflect the fact that firms adopting amendments tend to 
be larger, despite our attempt to control this feature of the data 
in our sample design.  16 
We also note a contrast between these data  and  statistics 
concerning ownership  by the board of directors  at Fortune 500 firms 
as reported by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny  (1988).  In the sample 
of 371 firms examined by these authors, mean ownership by directors 
of the corporation is 10.6  percent, while median ownership is 3.4 
percent.  These magnitudes are similar to those that we report for 
ownership by all officers and directors at firms offering charter 
amendments, and less than the comparable  statistics for our control 
f  irms.  Our  statistics  are  not  directly  comparable  to  those 
reported by Morck et al.,  since we use ownership by all officers 
and directors as reported on the proxy, while they do not include 
ownership by  officers who are not directors.  Inspection of our 
16~irms  in the random sample that propose amendments tend to 
be larger than firms in the random sample that do not propose 
amendments.  When we constrain the sample to include only matched 
pairs where the equity value of the firm in the random sample 
differs from the equity value of the firm proposing an amendment 
by less than 20 percent, the sample size is reduced by nearly 
two-thirds to a total of 122 firms, and there is still a 
substantial size difference between firms that propose amendments 
and firms that do not. None of the estimated relationships 
reported here is changed by this selection criterion, although 
most differences become statistically insignificant.  An appendix 
containing versions of tables 1-11 for the smaller sample is 
available from the authors upon request. 
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sample suggests, however, that the impact of ownership by  these 
individuals is likely to be slight. 
2.4  Block Ownership 
We recorded ownership  by 5  percent blockholders as  reported in 
the proxy  statement, and checked this against Spectrum 5.17  We 
also recognize  the  distinction  between beneficial ownership  and the 
voting  rights  that  are  actually  controlled  by  an  investor. 
Institutional investors are required by  SEC regulations to report 
shares as being beneficially owned when those shares are held for 
the account of clients who control the voting rights attached to 
the  shares.  In  many  cases,  investors  who  are  5  percent 
blockholders  on the basis  of their beneficial  interest do not 
actually  enjoy  the right to vote any  of those shares.  As a 
consequence,  the  use of beneficial ownership data as  an explanatory 
variable in cross-sectional regression models of voting behavior 
may induce a serious errors-in-variables problem.  We attempt to 
control  this  problem by recording  voting and disposition rights,  as 
well  as beneficial  interest  for  5  percent  blockholders.  The 
17spectrum 5 is published by CDA Investment Technologies 
using data from 13G, 13D and 14D-1 filings at the SEC. 
Comparison of the series from these two sources revealed a 
significant number of discrepancies.  We attempted to reconcile 
these by consulting the Wall Street Journal Index and related 
stories in the Wall Street Journal around the proxy mailing date. 
The data from the proxy usually appeared to be more reliable. 
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blockholder actually controls the right to vote the shares.18 
Summary  statistics  for  block  ownership,  institutional 
ownership, and firm size are presented in table 5.  The definition 
of  most of these  variables is straightforward.  An outside director 
is any director who is not also an officer of the corporation.  We 
deemed an institutional investor to be affiliated with the firm 
issuing a proxy statement, and therefore not independent of that 
firm,  if  we  determined  either  that  the  firm  has  a  client 
relationship with the institution (as in the case of a bank), or 
that  an officer of the corporation  is described  in  the proxy 
statement as being  an  officer or trustee of the  institutional 
investor.  Affiliated  investment  plans  include  employee  stock 
ownership plans,  payroll  stock  ownership plans,  and  all  other 
affiliated investment plans.  In addition,  we report institutional 
ownership from The Standard &  Poor's Stock Guide during the month 
preceding the proxy mailing, and  firm size, as measured by  the 
total value of outstanding equity. 
A notable feature of the table is that median block ownership 
is zero in every category.  Although the evidence presented below 
indicates that block ownership plays a significant role at the 
18~pecifically,  the statistics refer to the shares for which 
the individual or group enjoys beneficial ownership and at least 
shared voting power.  Mean beneficial ownership is roughly double 
mean voting power for institutional blockholders at the 345 firms 
in our sample.  In contrast, that same difference is less than 2 
percent for chief executives.  There is no apparent difference in 
the relationship between voting rights and shares of beneficial 
interest across the amendment sample and control sample. 
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Sumnary statistics for block ounership,  institutional ounership,  and firm size for a sample  of 197 NYSE  Listed 
firms offering antitakover charter  amendments  during 1984-1985,  and a control sample  of 148 NYSE  Listed firms 
that do  not offer charter amendments during the same  period. 
Block ounership  1 
Amendment  sample  2  Control sample  3 
Mean  Median  u  Mean  Median  u  4 
ALL  officers and directors 
Outside directors  5 
All institutions 
Independent  institutions  6 
Affiliated investment plans  7 
Amendment  sample  Control sample 
Mean  Median  u  Mean  Median  u 
Institutional ounership  8  41.73  43.90  17.93  41.23  34.20  59.23 
Outstanding equity in  hundreds  of  13.03  5.99  20.79  6.40  2.81  11.54 
millions of dollars 
'ALL  block ounership data are from the proxy statement  and  10K  filings,  and  include only those shares  for 
uhich the individual or group enjoys either shared voting pouer  or sole voting pouer. 
L~he  amendment  sample  consists of  all  observations  in  table 1 for uhich a charter amendment  is  found on 
the proxy statement,  including those firms in  the random  sample  that satisfy this criterion. 
3~he  control sample consists of all  observations contained in  table 1 for uhich no charter amendments are 
found on  the proxy statement. 
4~ample  standard deviation. 
5~utside  directors are directors uho are not also officers of the corporation. 
61ndependent  institutions have neither an identifiable client relationship uith the firm that proposes an 
antitakeover  amendement,  nor any shared officers or directors. 
7~ncludes  employee  stock ounership plans,  payroll stock  ounership plans,  and  thrift plans. 
8~nstitutional  ounership data are from the Standard &  Poorls  Stock Guide. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm23 
margin, there are no 5 percent blockholders for more than half of 
the firms.  One explanation is the significant size of a 5 percent 
equity stake, which requires an investment of $15 million at the 
median firm in the  control sample, and an investment of $30  million 
at the median firm in the amendment sample. 
Summary  statistics  for differences  in  these variables  are 
presented in table 6.  Point estimates suggest that all types of 
blockholders, with the exception of affiliated investment plans, 
are  less  influential  at  firms  that  implement  antitakeover 
amendments.  The data  also reveal  that  institutional ownership 
tends  to  be  greater  at  firms  that  implement  antitakeover 
amendments, and that these firms tend to be larger. 
2.5  Earnings Profiles 
The evidence presented in Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny  (1989) 
suggests that earnings history and expectations of future earnings 
might  influence the decision to adopt an antitakeover provision. 
We  constructed an earnings profile of each  firm  in the sample, 
consisting  of  the yearly  change  in  the logarithm  of  earnings, 
beginning two years prior to the year in which the amendment was 
proposed  and  ending  two  years  after  adoption.  We  observe  no 
significant differences in these profiles across the two samples. 
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Differences in  block ownership,  institutional ounership,  and  firm size betueen a  sample  of 197 NYSE  Listed 
firms proposing charter amendments during 1984-1985  and a sample  of  148  NYSE  Listed firms that do  not 
propose charter amendments  during the same  period.  Each  test statistic is  calculated by subtracting the 
sample moment  for the control group from the corresponding  sample  moment  for the group  of  firms offering 
antitakeover  amendments. 
Block ownership  1 
ALL  officers and directors 
Outside directors 
ALL  institutions 
Independent  institutions 
Affiliated investment  plans 
Institutional ounership  4 
Outstanding  equity  in  hundreds  of 
millions of dollars 
Rank 
Mean  stat:stic2  statistic  3 
x 
Median  statistic 
t  Rank 
Mean  statistic  statistic 
x2 
Median  statistic 
0.50  0.11  2.98*  9.70  7.74* 
6.55  3.45*  4.04*  3.18  10.96* 
'ALL block ounership data are from the proxy statement  and SEC  form 10K  filings,  and  include only those 
shares  for uhich the individual or group enjoys  either shared voting power  or sole voting power. 
2~ *  indicates that a  test statistic is  significantly different from zero at the 5 percent  Level  of 
significance. 
3~he  distribution of  the nonpararnetric  rank statistic is  approximately normal  in  Large  samples. 
4~nstitutional  ounership data are from the Standard &  Poorls  Stock  Guide. 
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2.6  Wealth Effects 
Summary  statistics  for  announcement  returns  realized  by 
portfolios corresponding to different  proxy  agenda,  around  the 
proxy mailing date, are presented  in table 7.19  All returns are 
expressed as a percentage of firm value.  Calculations are based on 
the market model, with the CRSP Equally Weighted Index serving as 
the market proxy  and days -170 through -21 used  for estimation. 
Statistics based  on the Standard &  Poor's  Composite index rather 
than  the  CRSP  Equally  Weighted  Index  are  also  reported  to 
facilitate comparison with Jarrell and  Poulsen's  results and to 
assure the reader that our conclusions are not sensitive to this 
feature of the estimation procedure. 
The magnitude of wealth effects associated with the proposal 
of  antitakeover  amendments  is  generally  quite  small.  Point 
estimates  in  the  [-1,1] window  are  positive  for  a  number  of 
portfolios.  The null hypothesis of zero cannot be rejected in any 
191f the outcome of voting is a foregone conclusion, the 
wealth effects of proposed changes in corporate policy should be 
reflected in share prices when the proxy material becomes public. 
Bhagat (1983)  and Bhagat and Brickley  (1984) find that 
information on events noted in the proxy statement is impounded 
in share prices when the proxies are mailed.  Larcker (1983) 
finds a significant market reaction on the day the SEC receives 
the  proxy -- the SEC "stamp date."  Brickley, Bhagat, and Lease 
(1985) find that proxy date precedes the SEC stamp date by an 
average of 3.2  days (median  =  3.0  days).  Linn and McConnell 
(1983)  note that for some firms, the information in the proxy 
statement is released around the time of the board meeting rather 
than on the proxy mailing date. 
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Sumnary statistics for announcement  returns realized by a sample of 191  NYSE  Listed firms offering antitakeover 
amendments  during 1984-1985  and  announcement  returns realized by a control portfolio of 141  NYSE  Listed firms 
selected  on  the basis of  size and  industry.  ALL  returns are expressed  as  percentage of  firm value.  Day  0 
corresponds -to the proxy mailing date. 
Announcement  returns for days  C-1,ll using the CRSP  Equally Weighted  Index as  the market  index 
Standard  . Sample  Number, 
Portfolio  Mean  Median  deviation  z-statistic'  sizeL  positive' 
All returns  0.35  0.16  4.05  2.31  332  181 
Control  0.94  0.62  4.35  4.11  141  88* 
ALL  amendments 




Bundled  agenda 
Hidden amendment 
Announcement  returns for days  C-1,lI using the Standard 8  Poorls  Composite as  the market  index 
Standard  Samole  Number 
Portfolio  Mean  Median  deviation  z-statistic  size  positive 
ALL  returns  0.25  0.02  4.06  1.70  332  169  - - 
Control  0.84  0.46  4.36  3.68  141  84* 
ALL  amendments  -0.18  -0.32  3.78  -0.92  191  85 
Entrench board  0.06  -0.38  3.34  -0.11  119  55 
Fair price  0.05  -0.25  3.39  0.17  141  64 
Blank check  -0.13  -0.58  3.26  -0.22  36  15 
Antigreermail  -0.14  -0.46  5.86  -0.33  44  20 
Bundled  agenda  0.86  -0.46  5.04  1.25  23  12 
Hidden amehent  0.72  -0.27  4.38  0.86  8  4 
Announcement  returns for days  C-20,101 using the Standard 8  Poorls  Composite as  the market  index 
Standard  Sample  Number 
Portfolio  Mean  Median  deviation  z-statistic  size  positive 
ALL  returns  0.23  -0.03  11.32  0.96  332  164 
Control  0.64  0.14  12.40  1.48  141  72 
All amendments  -0.08  -0.32  10.47  -0.01  191  92 
Entrench board  -0.24  -0.32  10.19  0.34  119  58 
Fair price  -0.00  -0.78  10.88  0.26  141  68 
Blank check  -2.17  -1.73  9.22  -1  -22  36  12* 
Antigreermail  -0.50  -2.51  12.34  -0.48  44  20 
Bundled agenda  0.33  -4.41  13.93  0.09  23  10 
Hidden amehnt  2.49  0.81  10.81  0.32  8  5 
'~onstructed  using  standardized  returns.  See  Dodd  and  Warner  (1983) for  the  definition of  this 
statistic. 
'~hirteen  of the 345 firms in  the sample  had missing returns. 
'A  *  indicates that  the null hypothesis of a mean  return equal  to zero  is rejected at the 5 percent 
Level  of  significance in  a two-tailed test. 
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previous authors.  20 
The  first  two  lines  of  each  panel  in  table  7  suggest  an 
explanation of the observed returns that  is consistent with the 
conjecture  that  antitakeover  amendments  decrease  shareholder 
wealth.21  The portfolio of 141 proxy statements where there is no 
antitakeover  amendment  on  the proxy  agenda  realizes  a  positive 
announcement return that is statistically different from zero at 
the 1 percent  level.  The portfolio  corresponding to the random 
sample  of  proxy  statements  also  realizes  a  statistically 
significant positive  return.  22  If the potential  announcement of 
an  antitakeover amendment is associated with increased risk  that is 
priced by the market, then the portfolio of all stocks subject to 
that announcement  risk will realize a positive expected return.  23 
At  announcement,  a  favorable  resolution  of  uncertainty  is 
associated with a positive  announcement  effect.  An unfavorable 
resolution is associated with a lower return, which may  still be 
positive  in absolute value.  If we accept this explanation, the 
20~arrell  and Poulsen report announcement effects that are 
not significantly different from zero in short return windows. 
In the longer return window, the discrepancy between our results 
and theirs may be accounted for by the larger size of their 
sample. 
21~iller  and Scholes (1982, p.  1126) note that It.. . there 
may be an important clue in knowing that the dogs did not bark!" 
22~hese  results contrast with those reported by  Brickley 
(1986),  who finds no statistically significant effect at proxy 
mailing for a random sample of firms during 1978-1982. 
23~alay  and Loewenstein (1985)  make a similar observation 
concerning dividend announcements. 
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non-negative  return  realized  by  portfolios  that  contain 
antitakeover  amendments  represents  the  combined  effect  of  a 
positive reward  for risk and  a negative wealth effect  from  the 
antitakeover amendment. 
A crude test of this  hypothesis is  presented in table 8, where 
the returns on different portfolios of antitakeover amendments are 
contrasted  with  the  return  on  the  portfolio  of  clean  proxy 
statements.  In every case, the point estimate indicates that one 
does better by failing to announce an antitakeover amendment than 
by announcing an amendment.  In the [-1,1] window, the parametric 
z-statistic rejects the null of equal mean performance  at the 1 
percent level of significance for every portfolio of antitakeover 
amendments.  The nonparametric rank statistic rejects the null for 
the portfolio of all antitakeover amendments.  The null of equal 
median  performance  is  rejected  for  the  portfolios  of  all 
antitakeover amendments, amendments that entrench the board, and 
fair-price amendments.  24 
In the longer return window examined by Jarrell and Poulsen, 
the null of equal mean performance is rejected at the 5 percent 
level  only  in  the  case  of  the portfolio  corresponding  to the 
authorization of blank-check preferred stock.  While these results 
do not conflict with those reported by Jarrell and Poulsen in a 
24~he  parametric statistic is based on the maintained 
hypothesis of a mean shift.  We tested for a shift in variance 
and failed to reject the null of equal variance for each of the 
portfolios described in table 8. 
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Difference between  announcement  returns realized by a sample of  191  NYSE  Listed firms offering antitakeover 
amendments during 1984-1985  and  announcement  returns realized by a control portfolio of 141  NYSE  Listed firms 
selected on the basis of size and  industry.  Each difference is  calculated by subtracting the return realized 
by the control portfolio from the return realized by the portfolio of firms offering antitakeover amendments 
of the specified type.  ALL  returns are expressed as  a percentage of firm value.  Day 0 corresponds to the proxy 
mailing date. 
Difference in  announcement  returns for days  C-1.11  using the CRSP  Equally Weighted  Index as  the market  index 
Portfolio 







z  1 
Rank  12 
Mean  statistic  statistic  Median  statistic 
-1.03  -3.05*  -2.21*  -0.73  5.44* 
-0.85  -2.99*  - 1.99*  -0.75  6.83* 
-0.83  -2.62*  -1.91  -0.94  5.12* 
-0.99  -3.70*  -1.53  -1.22  3.63 
-0.96  -3.63*  -0.76  -0.46  1.16 
0.02  -3.29*  -0.04  -0.94  0.05 
0.01  -3.75*  0.28  -0.48  0.00 
Difference in  announcement  returns for days  C-1,ll  using the Standard &  Poor's Composite  as  the market  index 
z  Rank  Y 2 
Portfolio  Mean  statistic  statistic  Median  statistic 







Difference in  announcement  returns for days  C-20,101 using the Standard &  Poor's  Composite  as  the market  index 
Portfolio 







z  Rank  % 2 
Mean  statistic  statistic  Median  statistic 
-0.72  -0.96  -0.09  -0.46  0.31 
-0.88  -0.86  -0.03  -0.46  0.14 
-0.64  -0.86  -0.11  -0.92  0.35 
-2.81  -1.87*  -1.01  -1.87  1.34 
-1.14  -1.52  -0.57  -2.65  0.54 
-0.31  -1.34  -0.67  -4.55  0.46 
1.84  -1.36  0.53  0.67  0.50 
'A * indicates that the test statistic rejects the null hypothesis of equal returns for the two portfolios 
at the 5 percent  Level of significance in  a tuo-tailed test. 
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contains significant noise.  25 
The test statistics in table 8  suggest that the inference of 
a  negative  wealth  effect  is unlikely  to  be  a  consequence  of 
sampling  variation.  The  point  estimates  for  the  different 
portfolios  do, however,  ignore a  substantial amount of  sample 
information.  Even if traders have no data about the identity of 
firms  that  will propose amendments other than ownership statistics 
(which seems unlikely),  anticipation of  the proxy  agenda  will 
contaminate announcement returns.  More precise estimates of the 
wealth effects associated with the different types of amendments 
may  be  obtained  from  an estimator that  incorporates available 
information  about  the  likelihood  of  an  announcement.  Before 
turning  to  the  construction  of  this  estimator, we  offer  some 
evidence that is germane to our discussion of predictability. 
2.7  Antitakeover Amendments Outside the Sample Period 
Firms that did not enact antitakeover amendments during 1984 
or 1985 may  have enacted amendments either before or after the 
sample  period.  This  raises  the  possibility  that  observed 
differences between firms that enact amendments and firms that do 
not enact amendments during our sample period are related to the 
timing of  implementation rather than to any genuine difference 
between the two samples. 
25~he  results of Brown and Warner (1985) suggest that the 
noise in a 31-day window may have a substantial impact on test 
statistics. 
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The data in table 9, which describe the experience of sample 
firms with respect to antitakeover amendments outside the sample 
period, speak to this issue.  The first panel of table 9 presents 
information for all firms in the sample drawn from proxy materials 
and the Investor Responsibility Research Center  (1987) survey of 
antitakeover amendments implemented by  Fortune 500 firms through 
the end  of  1987.  The second panel  focuses on the Fortune 500, 
where our information is more precise. 
The  data  in  the  table  indicate  that  the  events  which 
transpired during the  two  years of our sample are representative of 
the experience of sample firms with respect to  the implementation 
of antitakeover amendments.  Firms that proposed amendments during 
1984 or 1985  were much more likely to  have an amendment in place by 
the  end of 1987: The different experience during the sample period 
does not  appear to be  a matter  of  timing.  Moreover,  activity 
during the  sample period seems  to  represent a genuine change in the 
status  of sample firms with respect to  takeover defenses, since our 
information  indicates  no  significant  difference  in  takeover 
defenses prior to the sample period. 
3.  Cross-Sectional Models 
3.1 An Estimator for Wealth Effects 
It  is  well  known  that  the  anticipation  of  an  event  will 
contaminate announcement  effects.  When this occurs,  consistent 
estimates  of  wealth  effects  are  produced  by  estimators  that 
incorporate the ex ante announcement probability.  Malatesta and 
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The  experience with respect  to charter amendments  of a sample  of  197 NYSE  Listed firms offering antitakeover 
charter amendments  during 1984-1983,  and  a control sample  of  148 NYSE  Listed firms that do  not offer charter 
amendments during the same  period. 
Full data  set 
Amendment  Control  xL 
sam~  1  e  sam~le  statistic2 
Known  to have  some  antitakeover 
amendment  by the end  of  1987 
Known  to have some  antitakeover 




Amendment  Control  X 2 
sample  sample  statistic 
Known  to have some  antitakeover  84  24  59 
amendment  by the end  of  1987 
Known  to have  some  antitakeover 
amendment  at the proxy mailing 
date 
Sample size 
'ALL  data are from the proxy statement,  10K  filings,  and  Investor Responsibility Research Center  (1987). 
2  2~he  x  statistics of 248 and 59 are significantly different from zero at 1 percent.  Neither of the other 
statistics rejects the null of no difference for the two  samples. 
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announcements  is  uncertain,  and  simultaneously  estimate  the 
probability  of an event and the wealth effect of the event from 
time  series  of  stock  returns.  Acharya  (1989) also  considers 
situations in which timing is uncertain, but draws on the work of 
Heckman  (1978) and extends the analysis to include instrumental 
variables that reflect cross-sectional variation in the likelihood 
of an announcement.  We too draw upon Heckman's work, but focus on 
situations  where  the  timing  of  an  announcement  is  known  with 
certainty.  Instrumental variables are used to obtain consistent 
estimates of the prior probability of the event.  Estimated wealth 
effects are then extracted  from cross-sectional  returns using a 
nonlinear estimat~r.~~ 
We base our analysis on the following set of assumptions: 
(1)  The timing of an event is known with certainty. 
(2)  The value of the firm contingent upon the event is PE,  while 
the  value of the firm in the absence of the event is PNE. 
(3) The ex ante probability of the event contingent upon a vector 
x of firm characteristics is a  (x)  . 
(4)  Risk-neutral pricing obtains in the market. 
26~hen  the timing of the event is known, the probability of 
,the  event is zero during the period surrounding the announcement. 
Time series of stock prices do not have the informational content 
attributed to them in the estimators proposed by Acharya and 
Malatesta and Thompson, and using the estimator employed here 
increases efficiency.  In addition, the use of cross-sectional 
models allows us to exploit some important statistical results 
due  to  White  (1982)  and Vuong  (1989). 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm34 
(5)  The return observed when the  event occurs is R,,  while a return 
of R,,,  is observed when no event occurs. 
Risk-neutral pricing implies that the  price prior to  the  event 
is equal to  the  expected price at resolution, or P = aP, +  (1-a)P,,. 
The returns observed are R,,  =  (P,,  - P)/P when no event occurs and 
R,  =  (P, -  P)/P  when  the event  does occur.  These depend  on n 
through P.  The statistic of interest is the  economic impact of the 
event on shareholder wealth, which is (P, - P,,)/P,,.  If P,  =  yP,,, 
then it is straightforward to show that 
RNE  =  [T(~-Y)  I/[~(Y-l)+ll  (1) 
RE  =  [ (1-n)  (Y-1)  I/[~(Y-l)+ll 
Observed returns are a nonlinear transformation of the  probability 
that  the  event will occur and the  true  wealth effect.  The estimate 
of y implied by equation (1)  is a weighted sum of observed returns, 
where the  weights are inversely proportional to the  probability of 
the realized outcome. 
In the cross-sectional econometric model implied by equation 
(I), we assume that the wealth effect  y  depends on the type of 
amendment but not on the firm that adopts it, while the  probability 
of the  event n is firm-specific.  Estimates of n are obtained from 
a probit model where the dependent variable is the event and the 
independent  variable  is  the vector  of  firm  characteristics  x. 
Estimation  of  the probit  model  by  maximum  likelihood  yields  a 
parameter estimate p.  A consistent estimate of n(x) is provided 
by  F(xp),  where  F  denotes  the  normal  distribution  function. 
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Substituting  this  estimate  for  w  in  (1) and  estimating  y  by 
nonlinear maximum likelihood yields a two-stage estimator 9. 
Two  generalizations  of  this  estimator  are  immediate  and 
straightforward.  The first involves multiple outcomes.  If Pj  is 
the  value of the firm contingent on outcome j and we assume that Pj 
= yjPl  with yl  =  1, then it is straightforward to show that Rj  =  (yj 
-  a*y)/w-y  where w is the vector of probabilities  and  y  is the 
vector of wealth effects.  Two-stage estimation involves recovering 
the probability vector w in the first stage, through multinomial 
probit or log-linear estimation, for example.  These estimates are 
then  used to  extract the  vector 9  from the  cross-section of returns 
in the second stage. 
This estimator may  be used to represent the interaction of 
agenda items, as well as the interaction between agenda items and 
strategic  behavior.  The  interaction  of  two  agenda  items  is 
captured by  estimating wealth effects yl,  y2, and y12,  which occur 
with  probabilities wl  (x)  , w2(x)  , and  a12  (x)  , respectively.  The 
effects of strategic behavior are estimated by  letting the wealth 
effect of an amendment and its associated probability be yl,  al(x) 
when  strategic behavior  is absent and  yl*,  nl*(x)  when  strategic 
behavior occurs. 
A second generalization of (1)  allows y to  be a function of x. 
This formulation permits wealth  effects to depend  on  ownership 
structure.  The special case y  (x)  = y, described above, occurs when 
the wealth effect of a change in governance is not a function of 
the  characteristics  of  the  firm  that  experiences  the  change. 
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Heckman  (1978) shows that an econometric model with the general 
form y (x)  is identified by the nonlinearity in probit or logit even 
when all of the variables used to explain w(x)  are also used to 
explain y (x)  . 
Estimating any of these models with our choice-based sample 
requires a correction for sample selection bias.  We employ the 
weighted  maximum  likelihood  technique  suggested  by  Manski  and 
Lerman  (1977)  , which is discussed in Amemiya  (1985)  .27  Let w be 
the fraction of firms that adopt an antitakeover amendment in a 
random  sample,  and  w  be  the  fraction  of  firms  that  adopt  an 
amendment in the combined sample.28  When estimating the model  (1) 
with  the biased  sample, the log  likelihood of  each  observation 
where  an amendment  is  enacted  is weighted  by  w/w,  and  the log 
likelihood of all other observations is weighted by  (1-w)/(l-w). 
The weighting procedure is identical for models of the form y  = 
y(x).  A model with multiple outcomes requires a set of weights 
wi/wi  and (1-wi)/(l-wi).  We are unable to implement this  model with 
our data, since some of the agenda items occur with either zero 
27Amemiya  and Vuong  (1987)  demonstrate that the Manski- 
McFadden correction is more efficient than the Manski-Lerman 
correction employed here, and note that neither incorporates the 
improvements suggested by  Cosslett (1981).  We found the Manski- 
Lerman correction much more tractable for this estimation 
problem. 
28~n  our data, these values are (14/162) and  (197/345)  , 
respectively, for the portfolio of all antitakeover amendments. 
Different weights are applied to  the portfolio of fair-price 
amendments and portfolio of amendments that entrench the board of 
directors. 
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frequency  or very  low  frequency  in  the  random  sample.  As  a 
consequence, we limit our attention to the binary models. 
3.2  Ownership Structure and the Agenda 
The  probit  model  used  to estimate  a(x)  is  of  independent 
interest,  since  it  provides  an  assessment  of  the  relative 
importance of ownership characteristics in determining the proxy 
agenda.  Weighted maximum-likelihood estimates of the  model appear 
in table 10 for those agenda  items that occur with sufficiently 
high frequency to  permit estimation using the choice-based sample. 
In each case, the model  is estimated using all observations for 
which either the specified amendment appears on the proxy or no 
amendment appears on the proxy.  A constant term is included in 
every specification.  Size and the ratio of equity to compensation 
variables  are  expressed  in  logarithmic  form.  The  remaining 
variables,  which  measure  the voting  power  of  various  parties, 
represent the fraction of the total outstanding voting rights for 
which the individual or group enjoys at least shared voting power. 
Several common themes emerge. 
Variables  representing  the  compensation  of  officers  and 
directors  (estimates  are  not  reported)  are  econometrically 
irrelevant.  This feature of the  data persists across a wide number 
of  compensation definitions.  Nor  does the ratio  of  equity  to 
compensation, for either the chief executive officer (CEO) or all 
officers  and directors as  a group, have a significant impact on the 
likelihood that an antitakeover amendment will be proposed and 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable  10 
Weighted probit analysis of the relationship between ownership  structure and  the proxy agenda  for a sample of 
345 NYSE  Listed firms.  Table  entries are estimated coefficients,  with the absolute value of  the robust 
t-statistic in  parentheses. 
Dependent  variable 




Entrench  Entrench 
board  board 
0.04 
(1  -05) 
Ratio of  equity to 
compensation  for CEO 
Votes  controlled by CEO 
Ratio of  equity to 
compensation  for all 
officers and  directors 
Votes  controlled by all 
officers and  directors 
Votes  controlled by officers 
who  are blockholders 
Votes  controlled by 
outside directors who  are 
blockholders 
Votes  controlled by 
affiliated investment  plans 
Votes  controlled by 
institutional blockholders 
Votes controlled by 




Number  of  observations  345  345  293  293  2  70  270 
Lagrange  Multiplier test:2 
For ownership variables  18.74  20.80  19.13  21.70  22.57  23.76 
For instruments  25.19  29.38  24.69  28.88  22.42  31 -55 
Uald test:2 
For ownership variables  17183  26222  20293  25417  40503  47438 
For  instruments  17180  26216  20290  25413  40500  47430 
'size  and  equity-to-compensation  ratios are  in Logs;  all other  variables  are  in Levels.  JIVotes 
controlled by"  indicates the fraction of voting securities in  which the individual or group enjoys beneficial 
interest and  at Least  shared  voting power. 
2  2~he  test statistic is  distributed as  x  (q)  under the null hypothesis of no  joint explanatory power for 
the specified set of  variables.  The  degrees  of freedom q are equal  to the nunber  of variables included in  the 
test.  ALL  of  the Lagrange  multiplier statistics reject the  null at the 2 percent  Level.  ALL  of  the Uald 
statistics reject the null at the  1  percent  Level. 
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implemented.  We noted previously that all of these variables are 
likely to contain significant measurement error, and we therefore 
hesitate to ascribe any economic interpretation to these results. 
The  fraction  of  total  votes  controlled  by  the  CEO  is 
negatively  related  to the likelihood that  an amendment  will  be 
proposed, as is the fraction of votes controlled by  officers and 
directors, and the voting power of outside directors.29  Ownership 
by  these parties  appears to be  a deterrent  to value-decreasing 
change.  In contrast, there is a positive correlation between the 
likelihood of adoption and block holdings by both officers of the 
corporation and affiliated investment plans. 
Inspection of the sample of 113 firms in the combined sample 
for  which officers are also  blockholders suggests an explanation of 
the first phenomenon.  A large number of the blockholders in this 
group are members of the firms' founding families.  In many cases, 
inspection of the proxy documents reveals that a relative of the 
blockholder is also an officer of the  corporation.  This profile of 
a blockholder  is consistent with the characterization by  Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1989),  who note that the  presence of a member 
of the founding family on the top management team has a negative 
impact  on  the  likelihood  of  both  a  hostile  takeover  and  top 
management turnover. 
29When  the 18 firms excluded from the combined sample 
because of ownership by affiliated parties are included in this 
exercise, ownership by outside directors has a statistically 
significant deterrent effect. 
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The  positive  impact  of  ownership  by  affiliated  investment 
plans on  the  likelihood that antitakeover amendments will appear  on 
the proxy is striking. Both the magnitude of the estimated effect 
and  the  contrast  with  the  effect  of  increased  ownership  by 
corporate insiders are significant.  This block of votes has a very 
special feature:  The individuals who own the cash flows are not 
necessarily the same individuals who exercise the voting rights.  30 
When officers of the corporation control a block of votes and do 
not face the  cost of value-decreasing change, their willingness to 
enact  those  changes  is  apparently  quite  different  than  in 
situations where they do bear that cost. 
Ownership by  institutional investors does not appear to  have 
a  substantial  impact  on  the  introduction  of  antitakeover 
amendments.  Although the estimated coefficients are negative in 
the case of  all  institutional votes  and  in the case  of  voting 
blocks  controlled  by  independent  institutions,  none  of  the 
estimates is statistically significant.  Moreover, the magnitudes 
of estimated coefficients suggest that ownership by insiders or by 
other  individuals  with board  representation has  a  much  greater 
impact  on  the  likelihood  of  adoption  than  does  ownership  by 
institutions, which are typically  not  represented  on the board. 
These statements must, however,  be qualified by  the observation 
30~he  legal environment surrounding the voting of ESOP 
shares is discussed in section 4.  Scholes and Wolfson  (1990) 
argue that the main motivation for the growth of ESOPs is their 
utility in defending against hostile takeovers. 
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that  the variables  representing  institutional  voting  power  are 
likely to contain significant measurement error.  3  1 
Estimated coefficients are stable  across the  different type  of 
charter  amendments,  consistently  having  the  same  sign  and 
magnitude.  This  stability extends to  different sets  of regressors. 
Few of the  estimated coefficients are significantly different from 
zero at high degrees of precision.  (The  voting power of CEOs and 
affiliated investment plans are notable exceptions.)  But the  Wald 
test and the Lagrange Multiplier test reject the null of no joint 
explanatory power at high levels of significance for both the set 
of ownership variables and the instrument set, which also includes 
the size variable and the constant term.32  The latter result is 
worth keeping in mind, because Nelson and Startz (1990)  have shown 
that the use of instruments with little or no joint explanatory 
power can lead to spurious inference in the second stage of an 
instrumental variables procedure. 
3.3  Wealth Effects 
Weighted maximum-likelihood  estimates of the wealth effects 
associated with the different charter amendments are presented in 
table 11.  Although the estimated coefficients are small (on  the 
31~stimation  of the model with beneficial ownership data 
yields similar conclusions. 
32White (1982)  shows that the Wald test and Lagrange 
Multiplier test based on the robust covariance matrix are 
consistent under certain types of misspecification that distort 
the distribution of the more common likelihood ratio statistic. 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































order of 1 percent for all of the models), they are also precise 
and stable across different return windows and market indices.  The 
only point estimates that are not significantly different from zero 
are those estimated with a 31-day window. 
Comparison of these results with those of table 8 indicates 
that  estimated  wealth  effects  that  incorporate  announcement 
probabilities  exceed  estimates  derived  from  simple  two-way 
comparisons by  roughly 50 percent.  This is consistent with our 
conjecture that anticipation diminishes announcement effects.  The 
estimated  wealth  effects  presented  in  table  11  do  share  one 
property with the estimates in table 8.  There is little variation 
in wealth effects across the different categories of antitakeover 
amendments.  Jarrell  and  Poulsen's  conclusion  that  fair-price 
amendments do not have a negative impact on shareholder wealth is 
not  sustained  once the sample  selection bias  that contaminates 
their estimates is corrected. 
A Wald test based on the robust covariance matrix  fails to 
reject  the restriction y(x) =  y  for  any  of  the models.  This 
implies  that  no  significant  increase  in  explanatory  power  is 
achieved  by  allowing  wealth  effects  to  depend  on  ownership 
structure.  The test statistics in the table are constructed using 
returns for  [-Ill].  Tests based on other sets of returns yield 
similar conclusions. 
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3.4.1  Hidden Amendments 
The  small  number  of  hidden  charter  amendments  precludes 
estimation  of  a  structural  ownership  model  for  this  type  of 
amendment.  We can, however, compare ownership structure at firms 
that engage  in  this activity with  ownership structure at  other 
firms  that  offer  antitakeover  amendments.  Ownership  variables 
included  in  the  econometric  model  of  the  proxy  agenda  are 
contrasted in table 12. 
The data reveal a relationship between ownership structure at 
firms that enact hidden charter amendments and all other firms that 
enact  charter  amendments  that  is,  in  several  respects, 
qualitatively similar to  the  one between ownership structure at all 
firms that  enact  charter amendments and  ownership  structure  at 
firms that do not enact amendments.  Corporate officers control a 
smaller fraction of the voting securities and hold fewer 5 percent 
blocks.  Institutional ownership is greater, as is firm size.  We 
find no significant differences in ownership by outside directors 
or affiliated investment,  plans. 
These  relationships  suggest  the  following  explanation  of 
hidden amendments.  Managers who enact these amendments have weak 
ownership positions that lead them to seek contractual protection 
against  takeovers.  They  do  not  enjoy  the  support  of  strong 
affiliated investment plans that might allow them to implement a 
standard fair-price amendment or board entrenchment provision.  In 
the absence of opposition from strong independent directors, 
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A  comparison of eight firms that offer hidden antitakeover  amendments  with other  firms that offer 
antitakeover  amendments.  Each  test statistic is  calculated by subtracting the sample  moment  for the group 
offering antitakeover amendments  from the corresponding sanple moment  for the group  of firms offering hidden 
amendments. 
Voting power  calculated with ownership data from the proxy statement 
Votes  controlled by CEO 
Votes  controlled by all 
directors and  officers 
Votes  controlled by 
officers who  are block- 
holders 
Votes  controlled by 
independent directors 
who  are blockholders 
Votes  controlled by 
affiliated investment 
plans 
Institutional ownership  2 
Outstanding equity in 
hundreds  of millions of 
do1  lars 
t  Rank 
Mean  statistic  statistic 
x2 
Median  statistic 
-1.94  -1.08  -1.01  -0.19  0.95 
-5.05  -1.53  -1  .?7  -2.72  1.08 
Other  characteristics 
t  Rank 
Mean  statistic  statistic  1  x2  Median  statistic 
9.62  1.58  1.64  8.00  2.86 
9.71  1.37  1.30  1.71  1.02 
I~he  distribution of the nonparametric rank statistic is  approximately normal. 
'institutional ownership data are from the Standard &  Poor1s Stock  Guide. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm46 
corporate officers are free to pursue the strategic behavior--in 
the form of a hidden amendment--that appears to be an effective 
substitute for voting power. 
3.4.2  Bundled Agenda 
Ownership characteristics of firms that bundle antitakeover 
amendments with antigreenmail' amendments are contrasted with the 
ownership characteristics of other firms that offer antitakeover 
amendments in table 13.  The relationships that we observe are 
roughly comparable to those observed in the case of the hidden 
charter amendments.  Insiders at firms that offer bundled proxy 
agenda control fewer votes through direct ownership or affiliated 
investment  plans,  and  are  unlikely  to  be  held  in  check  by 
independent blockholders. 
4. Discussion 
4.1  Sample Selection Bias and the Endogenous Proxy Agenda 
The differences that  we have documented between firms that do 
propose antitakeover  amendments  and firms  that  do  not  propose those 
amendments implies that a selection bias arises when only  firms 
that actually enact amendments are used to study the causes and 
consequences of changes in corporate governance.  The empirical 
relevance of this issue is illustrated by several recent studies. 
Consider,  for  example,  the  findings  of  Brickley,  Lease,  and 
Smith (1988),  who  examine  the  relationship  between  ownership 
structure  and voting behavior in a truncated sample.  These authors 
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A  comparison of 24  NYSE  Listed firms that offer antigreermail amendments  bundled with other  charter 
amendments  during 1984-1985  and  other  firms that offer antitakeover  amendments.  Each  test statistic is 
calculated by subtracting  the sample  moment  for the group offering antitakeover  amendments  from the 
corresponding  sample  moment  for the group  of firms offering bundled agenda. 
Voting power  calculated with ownership data from the proxy statement 
Votes  controlled by CEO 
Votes  controlled by all  directors 
and  officers 
Votes  controlled by officers 
who  are blockhol.ders 
Votes  controlled by  independent 
directors who  are blockholders 
Votes  controlled by affiliated 
investment plans 
Institutional ownershipL 
Outstanding equity in  hundreds  of 
millions of dollars 
t  Rank 
Mean  statistic  statistic  1  xL  Median  statistic 
Other  characteristics 
t  Rank 
Mean  statistic  statistic 
x2 
Median  statistic 
4.86  1.25  1.30  3.00  1.64 
 he distribution of the nonparametric  rank statistic is  approximately normal. 
'~nstitutional ownership data are from the Standard &  Poorls  Stock Guide. 
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report a positive correlation between both managerial ownership and 
the  fraction  of votes  cast  for an  antitakeover  amendment,  and 
between  institutional  ownership  and  the fraction  of votes  cast 
against these amendments.  Our evidence suggests that inferences 
drawn from these correlations are likely to  be misleading.  We find 
that  increased  voting power  in the hands of corporate officers 
makes it less likely that shareholders will be confronted with an 
antitakeover  proposal,  while  the  managerial  voting  pattern 
documented in Brickley et al.  indicates that increased managerial 
ownership  will result in stronger support for  those amendments that 
are proposed. 
Since managerial  support  for  an  antitakeover  amendment  is 
irrelevant unless the  amendment is  actually proposed, the  deterrent 
effect  of  managerial  ownership  is  at  least  as  important  as 
managers' voting behavior in determining the circumstances under 
which an antitakeover amendment is likely to  be enacted.  A similar 
observation pertains to the apparent opposition of institutional 
investors to  antitakeover amendments.  We find the  marginal impact 
of  institutions  on  the proxy  agenda  to be  quite weak.  (This 
appears to  be related to  a lack  of board representation.  )  The fact 
that  institutional  investors  are  motivated  to  vote  against 
antitakeover amendments is  irrelevant if  proposed amendments are in 
fact adopted. 
Selection  bias  is  also  an  issue  in  studies  of  ex  post 
performance.  Pound  (1987) examines the relationship between the 
adoption  of an antitakeover amendment and the  subsequent likelihood 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmof a takeover using a sample of firms that enact amendments and a 
control sample of firms that do not adopt amendments, but he does 
not account for self-selection.  As a result, it is not possible to 
distinguish  the  impact  of  an  antitakeover  amendment  from  the 
characteristics of  firms that  adopt  those amendments using  his 
results.  The  negative  correlation between  the presence  of  an 
antitakeover amendment and the likelihood of a takeover documented 
in that study may  indicate that managers  who  are successful  in 
enacting amendments enjoy contractual  protection against takeovers 
despite poor performance, or  that those  managers tend to  outperform 
the  market, making discipline inappropriate,  or that firms adopting 
amendments tend to experience turnover initiated by  the board of 
directors, which  makes  external  discipline  unne~essary.~~  The 
contrast  between  the  conclusions  suggested  by  the  two-way 
comparisons in tables 4 and 6 and those suggested by  the models 
described in table 10 indicates that this issue is unlikely to  be 
moot. 
A final example of the influence of selection bias involves 
the cross-sectional regression of  abnormal returns on ownership 
characteristics.  Results of this type are reported by Jarrell and 
Poulsen and, more recently, by Agrawal and Mandelker (1990).  Both 
33~eisbach  (1988)  demonstrates that the presence of outside 
directors is associated with a positive correlation between 
management turnover and poor performance relative to other firms 
in the industry.  Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny  (1989)  characterize 
takeovers as an alternative mechanism that comes into play when 
poor performance affects an entire industry and the board of 
directors fails to initiate changes in management or policy. 
These findings suggest a set of explanatory variables for studies 
of the type conducted by  Pound. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmsets  of authors documenta positive correlation between returns and 
institutional  holdings  at firms  that adopt antitakeover amendments, 
using truncated samples.  Jarrell and Poulsen also report greater- 
than-average managerial holdings at  firms that adopt the type of 
amendments  having  the  greatest  negative  effect  on  shareholder 
wealth. 
Table 14 reports the results of estimating this type of model 
with our data.  The regression described in panel A uses the entire 
sample.  The results presented in panel B are based on a truncated 
sample  similar  to that  used  in  the  earlier  studies.  Neither 
specification involves a correction for selection bias.  Estimated 
coefficients in panel B are consistent  with results reported in the 
earlier studies.34  We compare these results to those produced by 
our two-stage estimator, and provide evidence of misspecification 
in the truncat-ed  regression. 
The likelihood ratio statistic in the last column of the  table 
tests the explanatory power of the two-stage nonlinear model of 
wealth  effects  against  the non-nested  alternative  of  a  linear 
regression  on  ownership  characteristics,  using  the  procedure 
described in Vuong  (1989).  The data  fail to reject the null, 
indicating  that  the  addition  of  eight  parameters  representing 
ownership and firm size to the estimating equation provides no 
34~ifferences  in the values of coefficients are either not 
statistically significant or are attributable to a difference in 
the specification of the model.  When we use returns from the 31- 
day window as the dependent variable and the regressor set 
employed by Jarrell and Poulsen, estimated coefficients are 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































significant increase in explanatory power.  It is not possible to 
test the explanatory power  of  the two-stage estimator directly 
against the truncated regression in panel B, but we can provide 
some evidence on the statistical validity of the second model.  A 
Hausman test of that model soundly rejects the null of consistent 
e~timation.~~  The same test applied to the model in panel A fails 
to reject the null.  This procedure confirms what intuition would 
suggest: Using a truncated sample leads to spurious inference. 
4.2 Econometric Issues 
White  (1982) and Vuong  (1989) provide a set of statistical 
tools that may be used in the analysis of cross-sectional data of 
the type considered here.  These afford inference in settings  where 
the  distributional  assumptions  used  to  construct  parameter 
estimates are inaccurate.  White offers procedures for detecting 
this type of misspecification and provides robust variants of the 
t-statistic,  Wald statistic, and Lagrange Multiplier test.  Vuong 
considers  situations  in  which  the  models  are  non-nested  and 
provides  tools  for  model  selection  when  neither  candidate 
represents the data-generating process. 
These  statistics play  an  important  role  in  our  results. 
Estimation of either the probit model described in table 10 or the 
35~he  Hausman test, as described by White (1982), compares two 
estimators that converge to the true parameter values under the 
null of correct specification,  but that diverge when the model is 
misspecified.  One of these estimators must also be efficient under 
the null.  The test statistics in the table are produced with an 
MLE estimator,  which is efficient under the null, and a weighted 
least squares procedure. 
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nonlinear  model  of  wealth  effects  described  in  table  11  with 
standard procedures  reveals no  statistically  significant cross- 
sectional relationship.  An  information matrix test reveals why 
this  is  so:  In  both  cases,  the  null  of  information  matrix 
equivalence is soundly rejected by  the data, indicating that the 
assumption of normality in the error term has been violated.  The 
insights  realized  from  tables 10  and  11  suggest  that  these 
techniques  may  be  applied  profitably  in  other  cross-sectional 
studies  motivated by issues in corporate finance, where results are 
typically weak. 
4.3  Employee Stock Ownership Plans 
The  most significant  voting block identified by our structural 
model of the proxy agenda is that of ESOPs and other affiliated 
investment  plans,  primarily  payroll  stock  ownership  plans  and 
employee thrift plans.  There are a number of distinctions between 
these vehicles for employee stock ownership.  The pertinent one is 
that the  trustees for stock held in ESOPs control the  voting rights 
attached  to  shares  that  have  not  been  passed  through  to  the 
accounts of individual  employee^.^^  As a consequence, a leveraged 
ESOP with trustees who are insiders  represents a dedicated block of 
votes.  The residual claimants to the cash flows associated with 
36~~~~s  are the only qualified pension plans that are 
permitted to borrow from the employer to acquire employer 
securities, or to acquire employer securities with a loan 
guaranteed by the employer.  Lenders are permitted to deduct 50 
percent of the interest realized from a loan, the proceeds of 
which are used to purchase employer securities for an ESOP.  See 
U.S.  Senate (1989). 
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unallocated shares in the leveraged ESOP are the shareholders of 
the corporation (in  those cases where the firm guarantees the loan 
used  to create the ESOP) and employees who will  purchase those 
shares at  some later date.  But  these parties have neither the 
right to dispose of the shares, nor the right to direct the voting 
of  shares.  The  separation between  ownership  and  control  could 
hardly be more complete. 
The role of ESOPs in facilitating the passage of antitakeover 
amendments  raises  a  related  issue.  Insiders  who  act  as ESOP 
trustees have a fiduciary responsibility to the individuals whose 
funds are invested in the plan.  That responsibility may prevent a 
trustee from actively opposing a takeover bid.  The burden of this 
responsibility  has  purportedly  caused  a  number  of  firms  to 
structure their ESOPs  in  a manner that precludes a conflict of 
interest in a takeover situation.  For example, the Polaroid ESOP 
calls  for  the  immediate  pass-through  of  voting  rights  on  all 
shares, both allocated and unallocated, in the event of a hostile 
tender offer  .37  If, however, the  votes associated with unallocated 
shares are used  to erect  takeover defenses, the disposition of 
voting rights in the event of a tender may be moot.  The fact that 
those votes cannot be used to oppose an actual bid does not imply 
that the  existence of the ESOP is immaterial for takeover activity. 
37~e  thank Mr.  David Binns, executive director of the Employee 
Stock Ownership Association, for explaining this issue. 
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4.4  Strategic Behavior 
Our evidence concerning the role of strategic behavior in the 
proxy process is largely circumstantial.  A vote controlled by  a 
party with board representation appears to  have a greater impact on 
the  likelihood  of  adoption  than  a  vote  controlled  by  a  party 
without board representation, suggesting that control of the  proxy 
agenda  and  the  proxy  voting  mechanism  is  valuable.  Hidden 
amendments, bundled agenda, and the ownership structure of firms 
that engage in these activities indicate why  this might  be  the 
case. 
One additional piece of evidence warrants mention.  In our 
sample of amendments, we have only a single example of a charter 
amendment being  re  j  ected by  shareholders.  38  But during 1988 and 
1989, shareholders rejected at least five antigreenmail amendments 
submitted to  a  vote.  Inspection  of the associated proxy statements 
reveals that the rejected proposals share one common feature: All 
were  submitted  by  shareholders  and  opposed  by  management. 
Although we can draw no strong conclusions from so small a sample, 
it  is  indeed  remarkable  that  the  support  or  opposition  of 
management seems  more important than  the  substance of the  proposal. 
38~he  managers of Informatics General Corp. requested 
shareholder approval of two antitakeover amendments when a merger 
proposal was outstanding.  One of these was bundled with an 
antigreenmail amendment.  Shareholders rejected these agenda 
proposals. 
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The corporate charter is a contract that governs relations 
between managers and shareholders.  We have examined the process 
through  which  changes  in  that  contract  are  implemented,  and 
documented  shareholder support  for wealth-decreasing  changes in 
governance.  While the  role of diffuse ownership and the  associated 
public-goods  problem  cannot be  overlooked  in  the search  for an 
explanation  of this phenomenon,  we have  provided  evidence  that 
strategic behavior may also play a role in proxy voting. 
The  results  documented  in  this  study  have  important 
implications  for  theories  of  security  design  and  ownership 
structure,  which  are  frequently  set  in  an  environment  where 
contracting costs and ex post coordination or enforcement are not 
central issues.  Disagreement among contracting parties is often 
induced  by  market  incompleteness,  which  generates  disagreement 
about  the value  of  state-contingent  claims.39  In other  cases, 
either asymmetric information about firm value or moral hazard on 
the  part of management gives rise to conflict between shareholders 
and  managers.  40  In  all  of  these  situations,  shareholders  are 
assumed to act as a group in designing and enforcing contracts. 
39~rossman  and Stiglitz (1977)  , DeMarzo  (1989)  , Ekern and 
Wilson (1974),  Allen and Gale (1988), and Dreyfus (1989)  all take 
this approach. 
40~arris  and Raviv  (1989)  and Gale and Hellwig  (1985)  study 
security design in the context of moral hazard.  Williams (1987) 
focuses on a setting with private information. 
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The  failure  of  shareholders to exercise  their  contractual 
right to block wealth-decreasing  changes in  governance suggests 
that transaction costs and ex post coordination problems deserve a 
more central role.  In an environment where transaction costs are 
a major issue, a primary function of securities is to resolve the 
public-goods  problem  among  agents who  find  it  costly  to gather 
information and enforce contracts.  Calomiris and Kahn (1989)  have 
recently  applied  these  principles  to  banking.  Our  analysis 
suggests a similar approach may be appropriate in the analysis of 
corporate capital structures and security design. 
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Sarrple firms and  proxy agenda.  The sample of  183  firms offering  antitakeover amendments  is Listed first in 
alphabetical order.  The remaining 162 firms comprise the random sample. 
Firm  Mailing  Any  Entrench  Fair  Blank  Anti-  Hidden  Bundle 
Date  Amend  Board  Price  Check  gmail 
AIRBORNE  FGHT  CORP  03/09/84  T  F  T  F  F  F  F 
ALBERTSONS  INC  04/12/85  T  F  T  T  F  F  F 
ALLEGHENY  INTL  INC  03/27/84  T  T  T  F  F  F  F 
ALUMINUM  CO  AMER  03/27/85  T  T  F  F  T  F  F 
AMERADA  HESS  CORP  03/28/85  T  T  F  F  F  F  F 
AMERICAN  CYANAMID  CO  03/07/85  T  F  T  F  F  F  F 
AMERICAN  PRESIDENT  COS  LTD  04/01/85  T  F  F  F  T  F  F 
AMPCO-PITTSBURGH  CORP  03/22/84  T  T  F  F  F  F  F 
AMSTED  INDS  INC  11/23/84  T  T  T  F  F  F  F 
ANDERSON  GREENUOOD  &  CO  04/17/84  T  F  T  F  F  F  F 
ANHEUSER  BUSCH  COS  INC  03/21/85  T  T  T  F  T  F  T 
ANTHEM  ELECTRS  INC  05/18/84  T  F  T  F  F  F  F 
APACHE  CORP  04/10/85  T  F  T  F  T  F  F 
ARKANSAS  BEST  CORP  04/10/84  T  T  T  F  F  F  F 
ATLANTIC  RICHFIELD CO  03/18/85  T  T  F  F  T  T  F 
AVERY  INTL CORP  02/26/85  T  F  F  F  T  F  F 
BALL CORP  03/11/85  T  T  T  T  F  F  F 
BARD  C  R  INC  03/13/85  T  F  T  F  F  F  F 
BARNETT  BANKS  FLA  INC  02/28/85  T  T  T  F  T  F  F 
BAUSCH  &  LOMB  INC  03/15/85  T  T  F  F  T  T  T 
BEATRICE  FOODS  CO  04/30/84  T  T  T  T  F  F  F 
BECTON  DICKINSON  &  CO  01/03/85  T  F  T  F  F  F  F 
BEVERLY  ENTERPRISES  03/25/85  T  F  F  T  F  F  F 
BINKS MFG  CO  04/09/84  T  T  F  F  F  F  F 
BORDEN  INC  03/05/84  T  F  T  F  F  F  F 
BOVNE  &  CO  INC  01/27/84  T  T  F  F  F  F  F 
BRISTOL  MYERS  CO  03/20/84  T  T  T  F  F  F  F 
BRWKLYN UN  GAS  CO  01/02/85  T  F  T  F  F  F  F 
BRUNSWICK  CORP  03/11/85  T  T  F  T  F  F  F 
BURLINGTON  NORTHN  INC  03/15/85  T  T  T  F  F  F  F 
BURNDY  CORP  03/22/85  T  F  T  F  F  F  F 
C I  G  N  A  CORP  03/11/85  T  F  T  F  F  F  F 
CABOT  CORP  12/28/84  T  F  T  F  F  F  F 
CARLISLE  CORP  03/20/84  T  F  T  F  F  F  F 
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CENTURY  TEL  ENTERPRISES  INC 
CHAMPION  SPARK  PLUG  CO 
CHESEBRWGH  PONDS  INC 
CONAGRA  INC 
CONNECTICUT  ENERGY  CORP 
CONSOLIDATED  FREIGHTUAYS  INC 
CONSOLIDATED  NAT  GAS  CO 
CONTINENTAL  INFORMATION  SYS 
COOPER  TIRE &  RUBR  CO 
CORNING  GLASS  MKS 
DATA  GEN  CORP 
DAYTON  HUDSON  CORP 
DE  LUXE  CHECK  PRINTERS  INC 
DIAMOND  SHAMROCK  CORP 
DORSEY  CORP 
DOVER  CORP 
DRESSER  INDS  INC 
DUCOMMUN  INC 
EAGLE  PICHER  INDS  INC 
EASTERN  GAS  &  FUEL  ASSOC 
EMERY  AIR FGHT  CORP 
EMPIRE  DIST ELEC  CO 
FABRI  CTRS  AMER  INC 
FACET  ENTERPRISES  INC 
FAIRFIELD  CMNTYS  INC 
FAYS  DRUG  INC 
FEDERAL  MOGUL  CORP 
FIRST UYO  BANCORPORATION 
FLEETUOOLI  ENTERPRISES  INC 
FLEMING  COS  INC 
FRUEHAUF  CORP 
FUQUA  INDS  INC 
GALAXY  CARPET  MLS  INC 
GENERAL  DATACOMM  INDS  INC 
GENISCO  TECHNOLOGY  CORP 
GERBER  PRODS  CO 
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GOLDEN  NUGGET  INC 
GOLDEN  WEST  FINL CORP  DEL 
GWLD  INC 
GREAT  NORTHN  NEKOOSA  CORP 
GRUMMAN  CORP 
GULF  &  WESTN  INDS  INC 
HARPER  &  ROW  PUBLISHERS  DEL 
HEALTH  MOR  INC 
HECKS  INC 
HELENE  CURTIS  INDS  INC 
HILTON HOTELS  CORP 
HOHE  DEPOT  INC 
HOHESTAKE  MNG  CO 
HONEYWELL  INC 
ILLINOIS TOOL  MKS  INC 
INEXCO OIL CO 
INFORMATICS GEN  CORP 
INTERCO  INC 
INTERNATIONAL  MINERALS &  CHEM 
INTERNATIONAL  MULTIFOODS  CORP 
INTERNATIONAL  PAPER  CO 
JAMESWAY  CORP 
KN ENERGY  INC 
KANEB  SVCS  INC 
KERR  MCGEE  CORP 
KEYSTONE  INTL  INC 
KNIGHT  RIDDER  NEWSPAPERS  INC 
KOPPERS  INC 
KUHLMAN  CORP 
LEAR  SIEGLER  INC 
LEGGETT  &  PLATT  INC 
LIBERTY  CORP  S  C 
LILLY ELI &  CO 
LINCOLN NATL  CORP  IND 
LONE  STAR  INDS  INC 
LONGS  DRUG  STORES  INC 
LOUISIANA LD  &  EXPL  CO 
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LUBRIZOL  CORP 
LUNDY  ELECTRS 8  SYS  INC 
MARRIOTT  CORP 
MARSH  &  MC  LENNAN  COS  INC 
MATRIX  CORP  N  J 
MC  DONNELL  DWGLAS CORP 
MC  GRAM  HILL INC 
MCKESSON  CORP 
MEAD  CORP 
MEASUREX  CORP 
MERCK  8  CO  INC 
MILTON  ROY  CO 
MOBIL  CORP 
NAFCO  FINL GRWP  INC 
N  C  R  CORP 
NALCO CHEM  CO 
NANTUCKET  INDS  INC 
NATIONAL  FUEL  GAS  CO  N  J 
NATIONAL  PATENT  DEV  CORP 
NOBLE  AFFILIATES  INC 
NORTEK  INC 
NORTHROP  CORP 
NORTON  CO 
OLIN CORP 
ONEOK  INC 
OUENS  ILL INC 
PARADYNE  CORP 
PAYLESS CASHUAYS  INC 
PENNEY  J  C  INC 
PHILIPS INDS  INC 
PHILLIPS PETE  CO 
PITNEY BWES INC 
POTLATCH  CORP 
PRAIRIE PRODUCING  CO 
PRATT  &  LAMBERT  INC 
PROCTER  &  GAMBLE  CO 
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RANSBURG  CORP 
RAYTHEON  CO 
REVLON  INC 
ROHR  INDS INC 
ROLLINS ENVIRONMENTAL  SVCS  INC 
RYDER  SYS  INC 
SCANA  CORP 
SCHERING  PLOUGH  CORP 
SECURITY  CAP  CORP  DEL 
SERVOTRONICS  INC 
SINGER  CO 
SNAP  ON  TOOLS  CORP 
SQUIBB  CORP 
STANLEY  UKS 
STERLING  DRUG  INC 
STOP  &  SHOP  COS  INC 
SUN  INC 
SUN  INC 
SYBRON  CORP 
SYSTEMS  ENGR  &  MFG  CORP 
TENNECO  INC 
TENNEY  ENGR  INC 
TEXACO  INC 
TEXAS  EASTN  CORP 
TEXTRON  INC 
THOMAS  &  BETTS CORP 
T IMKEN  CO 
TRANSUAY  INTL CORP 
U  S  G  CORP 
UNION PAC  CORP 
UNITED  STS  SHOE  CORP 
UNITED  STS  TOB  CO 
UNIVAR  CORP 
VAN  DORN  CO 
WLCAN MATLS  CO 
UARNACO  INC 
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WESTVACO  CORP 
FIRST  BK  SYS  INC 
LUCKY  STORES  INC 
INTERLAKE  INC 
ASHLAND  OIL INC 
UPJOHN  CO 
SOUTHEAST  BKG  CORP 
FLORIDA  STL  CORP 
TYLER  CORP 
MARK  CTLS  CORP 
SEAGRAM  LTD 
MARSHALL  INDS 
CAROLINA  FREIGHT  CORP 
TAMBRANDS  INC 
ANCHOR  HOCKING  CORP 
MEDTRONIC  INC 
POLAROID  CORP 
UNIVERSAL  FOODS  CORP 
AMERICAN  STERILIZER  CO 
MANOR  CARE  INC 
TWIN  DISC  INC 
DEAN  FOODS  CO 
STANDEX  INTL CORP 
COLGATE  PALMOLIVE  CO 
WISCONSIN  PUB  SVC  CORP 
CUMMINS  ENGINE  INC 
COLLINS &  AIKMAN  CORP 
WEST  POINT  PEPPERELL  INC 
THOMAS  INDS  INC 
C  S  X  CORP 
BANDAG  INC 
ECHLIN  INC 
MARION  LABS  INC 
PRIME  COMPUTER  INC 
ALAGASCO  INC 
OVERNITE  TRANSN  CO 
PANHANDLE  EASTN  CORP 
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ANACOMP  INC 
ARMSTRONG  RUBR  CO 
CONTROL  DATA  CORP  DEL 
HACY  R  H  8  CO  INC 
KERR  GLASS  MFG  CORP 
UNION  CARBIDE  CORP 
BROCKWAY  INC 
BAKER  INTL CORP 
COMMERCIAL  METALS  CO 
WEST  INC 
NORTH  AMERN  COAL  CORP 
AIR EXPRESS  INTL CORP 
SAVANNAH  ELEC 8  PWR  CO 
SHAPELL  INDS  INC 
PERRY  DRUG  STORES  INC 
REXNORD  INC 
FLEET  FINL GROUP  INC 
ANTA  CORP 
WINNEBAGO  INDS  INC 
SYSCO  CORP 
CHRIS  CRAFT  INDS  INC 
MASLAND  C  H  8  SONS 
AYDIN  CORP 
SEI  S  PROS  INC 
CASTLE 8  COOKE  INC 
CONQUEST  EXPL  CO 
UNIROYAL  INC 
BOl  SE  CASCADE  CORP 
INTERFIRST CORP 
GENUINE  PARTS  CO 
GROLIER  INC 
REECE  CORP 
ALEXANDERS  INC 
LA  MAUR  INC 
HOLIDAY  INNS  INC 
SCOTTYS  INC 
TRIANGLE  PAC  CORP 
Mai  1 ing 
Date 
02/ 1  1  /85 
01/05/84 
03/22/84 
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TRANSTECHNOLOGY  CORP 
LEUCADIA  NATL  CORP 
STRIDE  RITE CORP 
WILLIAMS  COS 
KIMBERLY  CLARK  CORP 
NICHOLS  S  E  INC 
MEDALIST  INDS  INC 
TONKA  CORP 
SOUTHERN  UNION  CO 
PITTSTON  CO 
MURPHY  OIL CORP 
PITTWAY  CORP 
WITCO  CHEM  CORP 
KEARNEY  NATL  INC 
G  C  A  CORP 
COLONIAL  PENN  GROUP  INC 
ABBOTT  LABS 
TORCHMARK  CORP 
TEXAS  INDS  INC 
PAY  LESS  DRUG  STORES  NORTHWEST 
MITCHELL  ENERGY  8  DEV  CORP 
INTERNATIONAL  FLAVORS  &  FRAG 
PENRIL CORP 
UNITY  BUYING  SVC  INC 
UENDYS  INTL  INC 
COMBINED  INTL CORP 
ELECTROSPACE  SYS  INC 
MC  GRAU  EDISON  CO 
LOCKHEED  CORP 
MAC  MILLAN  INC 
CROWN  ZELLERBACH  CORP 
BARRY  WRIGHT  CORP 
PFIZER INC 
GORMAN  RUPP  CO 
CHEVRON  CORPORATION 
STANDARD  OIL CO  IND 




































































































































































































Anti  - 



















































































































NEVADA  SVGS  &  LN ASSN 
LITTON  INDS  INC 
ETHYL  CORP 
STAN-  CORP 
WASHINGTON  GAS  LT CO 
REICHHOLD  CHEMS  INC 
RESEARCH  COTTRELL  INC 
FAIRCHILD  INDS INC 
OMENS  CORNING  FIBERGLAS CORP 
FEDERATED  DEPT  STORES  INC 
TEKTRONIX  INC 
U  N  C  RES  INC 
COMPUTERVISION  CORP 
STONE  CONTAINER  CORP 
GUARDSMAN  CHEMS  INC 
MARY  KAY  COSMETICS  INC 
PORTLAND  GEN  ELEC  CO 
WHEELING  PITTSBURGH  STL CORP 
HELMERICH  &  PAYNE  INC 
HARRIS  GRAPHICS  CORP 
AVON  PRODS  INC 
OVERHEAD  DOOR  CORP 
CESSNA  AIRCRAFT  CO 
UNITED  INNS  INC 
MISSOURI  PUB  SVC  CO 
OKLAHOMA  GAS  &  ELEC  CO 
MORTON  THIOKOL  INC 
PLANNING  RESH  CORP 
SEMTECH  CORP 
SCOVILL  INC 
EMHART  CORP  VA 
BAXTER  TRAVENOL  LABS  INC 
PARKER  HANNIFIN  CORP 
SYNTEX  CORP 
QUAKER  ST  OIL REFNG  CORP 
ESTERLINE  CORP 
UNITED  INDL CORP 
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AMERICAN  SCIENCE &  ENGR  INC 
GULFSTREAH  AEROSPACE  CORP 
PALL  CORP 
NATIONAL  GYPSUM  CO 
BROWN  GROUP  INC 
CONUOOD  CORP 
FRIES ENTMT  INC 
I  C  N  PHARMACEUTICALS  INC 
IMPERIAL  lNDS  INC 
PLANT  lNDS  INC 
G  A  F  CORP 
SANMARK  STARDUST  INC 
BROWNING  FERRIS  INDS  INC 
FAMILY DLR  STORES  INC 
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